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Abstract 
This paper considers the perceptions and responses of selected stakeholders to a very low 
probability but high consequence climatic „surprise‟ – a scenario of rapid collapse of the West 
Antarctic ice sheet, producing a global rise in sea-level of 5 metres over 100 years.  It uses a 
case study of the Thames Estuary, UK, including London. Through a process of dialogue 
involving one-to-one interviews and a one-day policy exercise, we addressed influences on 
decision-making when information is uncertain and our ability to plan, prepare for and 
implement effective ways of coping with this extreme scenario. 
The interviews and policy exercise explored plausible responses to the scenario and identified 
weaknesses in flood management approaches to dealing with such an occurrence.  The 
analysis shows that an extreme scenario could be highly challenging, even for an area with 
well-developed institutions. Participants favoured two options (i) reconfiguring London around 
the rising water, and (ii) building a new downstream barrier which would allow London to 
continue as today. The lack of consensus suggests the potential for policy paralysis in 
response to what is a highly uncertain phenomena – this could lead to a forced, unplanned 
response as the rapid change overwhelmed the existing defence capability. Hence, low 
probability, high consequence climatic events may challenge our existing institutions. 
Adaptive management is presented as an approach which could address this challenge. 
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1. Introduction 
Adaptation to climate change may require socio-economic and institutional changes beyond 
the framework of existing planning systems (often referred to as mainstreaming).  One such 
case would be if climate change triggers large consequence impacts, such as the rapid 
release of methane hydrates, rapid decline in the North Atlantic thermohaline circulation, or 
the collapse of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet (WAIS).  In the fourth assessment of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, such events were considered unlikely at best 
during the 21
st
 century (IPCC, 2007).  However, such low probability,  high consequence 
events may be important in planning climate policy responses (Klein et al. 2007), and may 
test the limits of adaptation (Adger et al. 2007).  As there has been limited investigation of  
responses to such events, the objective of this paper is to study the perceptions and 
responses of selected stakeholders to this type of potential climate change impact.   
Collapse of the West Antarctic ice sheet would produce a global rise in sea-level of 5 to 6 
metres  (Mercer 1978, Vaughan and Spouge 1992, Tol et al, 2007).  The scenario chosen to 
evaluate stakeholder responses represents a compromise between what is not implausible 
geophysically (although highly unlikely based on current knowledge) and what is still relevant 
for a project based on social discourse.  For the Thames case study, the WAIS was assumed 
to begin collapsing in 2030, with 5m SLR expected over the following 100 years.  The time 
horizon was chosen to be beyond current political processes, yet sufficiently near term to 
enable people to envisage the impacts. It is unlikely that stakeholders would engage in a 
debate on decision-making processes for events that would not occur for three or four 
centuries (a more plausible scenario for extreme sea level rise). 
In addition to uncertainty in the sea-level rise, there is uncertainty about changes in social 
structure, economic development and land use in the distant future.  For the purposes of 
exploring social responses to uncertain risks, the baseline of exposure was documented 
(Section 2) along with the spatial risks of the 5m SLR scenario (Section 3, see Dawson et al. 
2005).  Projections of future vulnerability, as would be required in a scenario-impact model 
study, were not attempted; rather rough estimates of the changes population and 
development were posed (Section 3).  Any impact model of a 5m SLR would be used far 
outside its domain of calibration and validation, and not necessarily assist in revealing social 
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risk responses.  Thus the project explores the social dimensions of adaptive management 
rather than presuming that we can predict the future and should target adaptation to such 
uncertain futures (for example, see the discussion of robust decision making in Lempert et al. 
2003). 
The methodology for understanding social risk responses relied on interviews with 
stakeholders, followed up with a role playing policy exercise (Section 6).  The results of the 
interviews and policy exercise are presented in Section 5.  A simple method to integrate the 
results are qualitative „storylines‟ or „future histories‟ that reflect the complex implications of 
what a 5-6 metre sea-level rise would mean to people (Section 8).  Section 9 discusses 
broader conclusions related to climate change adaptation processes.  Figure 1 summarises 
the approach of the project. 
 
 
 
 
2. Flood risk in the Thames estuary 
The Thames region extends from western boundary of the London metropolitan area to the 
tidal zones planned for development in the Thames Gateway (including Southend-on-Sea).  
The region is exposed to greater flood risk than any other area of the UK because of the 
concentration and value of its assets.  The greatest flooding threat comes from tidal surges, 
Figure 1: Overview of Thames case study process 
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although inundation by river floods, local flooding when inadequate drainage systems are 
overwhelmed and the rise of the water table are also risks. A surge is a meteorologically-
induced tide: in the southern North Sea positive surges can rise 2 meters or more above 
normal tides. If this coincides with a spring tide then the increase in tide height can be 
sufficient to overtop defences.  In 1953 a storm surge killed about 300 people, flooded 
240,000 houses and 65,000 hectares of farmland along the East coast and the Thames 
Estuary (ICE, I, 1954; McRobbie et al., 2005). Depending on its magnitude, a tidal surge 
today in the Thames region could affect 1.25 million residents (a sixth of the population of 
London), 1.5 million commuters and property and economic activities worth £80-100 billion 
(Parker, 2002). In addition, a major flood affecting the Thames region would be bound to have 
negative secondary impacts for almost the whole of Britain because, as the July 2007 riverine 
floods in England demonstrated, flood impacts spread well beyond flood prone areas. 
The Thames flood plain is the site of one of the largest increases in flood loss potential in 
Europe.  Since the 1980‟s there was significant regeneration of tidal flood prone land, 
including more or less the whole of the redeveloped docklands and riverside areas between 
the City and Woolwich.  Despite some adaptation of buildings and developments to flooding,   
damage potential has tripled between 1987 and 2000 for commercial property and increased 
2.5 times for residential property, partly due to ownership of technology (computers, multi-
media systems etc.); new for old insurance and a reduction in salvage of flood damaged 
items increases insured losses (Penning-Rowsell et al, 2002).  London is dependent on 
ageing and easily disrupted infrastructure.  The underground system is especially vulnerable.   
Flood management of the Thames estuary has evolved in a piecemeal manner, often in 
response to major floods.  The 1953 flood led to the decision to build the Thames Barrier and 
its associated defences, an idea first mooted in the early 1900s.  The barrier, which opened in 
1981, and its associated defences provide London with a high level of flood protection 
(currently greater than 1 in 1000 year event) (Gilbert and Horner, 1984).  This is well above 
the normal standard of protection for flood defence in the UK, but is justifiable given the 
number of lives, property and infrastructure at risk.  The standard of protection in outer parts 
of the estuary reduces to a 1 in 200 year event on the southern bank, as this is primarily 
agricultural land. 
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The design standard of protection provided by the barrier, due to be reached in 2030, may be 
reached sooner due to accelerated sea-level rise not accounted for in the design, although 
the probability of flooding will remain low (Kelly, 1991).  After 2030, the level of protection will 
continue to decline due to rising sea-levels unless the barrier is upgraded (Gilbert and Horner, 
1984, Kelly, 1991).  Mean sea-level and also extreme water levels have been rising for the 
last two centuries (D‟Olier, 1972, Bowen, 1972). A long-term rising trend of 0.4 mm/yr during 
the 19
th
 Century and 2.2 mm/yr in the 20
th
 Century has been observed at Sheerness 
(Woodworth, 1990; Nicholls et al, 1999).  Extreme water levels have risen more rapidly than 
mean sea-levels, at about 1 metre per century from the 1790s, and this trend was assumed to 
continue for the 50-year design life of the Thames Barrier (1980 to 2030). The interpretation is 
that tidal range/surge amplitude within the Thames Estuary has increased, probably due to 
reclamation of intertidal areas, and possibly deepening of the main channels.  While human-
induced morphological change is likely to continue through the 21
st
 Century, it is likely to be 
less significant than previously and this effect is not considered here.   
Planning for the new defences up to 2100 has already begun (Lavery and Donovan, 2005; 
Ramsbottom and Lavery, 2007).  In addition to the more traditional defence raising options, 
the managed realignment of the defence line inland of where it now stands is also being 
considered (Shih and Nicholls, 2007).  Furthermore, the government‟s new flood risk 
management policy, „Making space for water‟ (DEFRA 2005) recognises the importance of 
promoting more resistant and resilient building and development techniques. It is therefore 
possible that new developments in the Thames tidal floodplain will be adapted to flooding, 
while at least some existing ones may be retrofitted to make them less susceptible to flood 
damage. 
3. The Thames estuary case study scenario 
The population of Greater London is projected to grow to 8.1 million by 2016, with an increase 
in households from 3.1 million to 3.6 million.  The population is expected to continue to rise 
after this (DMAG, 2005). To sustain the growth of London, more development is planned, 
particularly in financial and business services.  The strategy is to regenerate East London and 
expand eastwards in a corridor on both shores of the tidal Thames to Shellhaven which will 
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be developed as a new „super-port‟.  This expansion will take the form of a series of new 
towns along the Thames in the largest co-ordinated building programme in the UK for 50 
years.   The developments will provide around 120,000 new houses and 180,000 new jobs to 
relieve overcrowding in central London and provide homes at a more affordable price for 
people on an average income (Greater London Authority, 2004).  Much of the planned 
development is in, or bordering on, the tidal flood risk zone.  The scale of this floodplain 
development is unprecedented and high standards of flood risk management are required as 
the consequences of a flood would be so great.  It is assumed that defences have been 
upgraded for a 1-m rise in sea level by 2030 – which means that significant impacts do not 
occur until sea levels rise more than a metre. For insurance companies, the losses from a 
major flood affecting central London would result in increased premiums pushing insurance 
out of the reach of people on low incomes making these people less able to recover in the 
event of future flooding. In some areas insurance cover might be withdrawn altogether, 
possibly leading to the collapse of the property market and urban blight and decay.   
There are great uncertainties in the sea-level rise scenario and other climate change impacts 
that will increase the risk of severe flooding.  Storm surges will be influenced by changes in 
the number, location and, particularly, the strength of storms (Lowe and Gregory, 2005).  
Regionally the Thames estuary is subsiding at 0.7mm/year in the Thames estuary (Shennan 
and Horton, 2002). Regional variations in climate-induced sea-level rise may also occur 
because the warming of ocean water is not uniform and neither therefore is the expansion of 
ocean water. Changes in ocean circulation and atmospheric pressure will also affect the 
distribution of sea-level rise. These regional differences in climate-induced sea-level rise can 
be quite substantial and can vary by up to ±50 per cent of the change in the global average 
(Hulme et al, 2002).  
The collapse of the West Antarctic Ice sheet is a poorly understood phenomenon (Nicholls et 
al., 2007), so the scenario for exploring social risk responses was kept very simple: a uniform 
global 5m rise over 100 years, starting in 2030 (Figure 1). The primary source of the 5m rise 
is assumed to be collapse of the West Antarctic Ice Shelf, although this does not preclude 
other contributions to the rise over this 100 year period (e.g., the melting of the Greenland ice 
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sheet (e.g. Gregory et al., 2004)).  Following the full collapse of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet 
in 2130 (in the scenario), global sea-level rise slows substantially (but would continue at least 
due to thermal expansion of the oceans). The selected scenario deliberately represents a 
significant climate „surprise‟ for London (and the world). 
All other climate factors are presumed to remain constant, which in relative terms, is a 
reasonable assumption.  In addition to raising ocean level, rising sea-level is assumed to 
raise all coastal processes that operate around sea-level and allows larger waves to reach the 
shore before breaking. Therefore, the immediate effect of a rise in sea-level concerns 
submergence and increased flooding of coastal land, and saltwater intrusion of surface 
waters.  
The flood analysis considers both surge flooding and increased river flooding upstream of the 
new tidal limit.  It is also assumed that all coastal ecosystems are lost, although some new 
habitats may develop inland.   
 
Figure 2: Sea-level rise scenario for the Thames case study  
 
The scenario assumes an increase in property and population at-risk, but not a significant 
change in flood planning in the UK.  When the accelerated sea-level rise begins in 2030, 
there is considerable uncertainty about how long it will continue and the future rate of sea-
level rise. 
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4. Impacts of the scenario 
The 5-metre sea-level rise would progressively overwhelm all the existing sea defences over 
a number of decades (Dawson et al., 2005), so assuming that storminess is unaffected by 
these changes and no new defences are constructed, the two main hazard zones are 
submerged land below maximum annual tides, lost to human utilisation, and the new coastal 
flood plain, the area below storm tides, where permanent human utilisation might continue but 
which would be susceptible to periodic flooding from storm surges. 
Due to the topography of the Thames estuary floodplain, the area at risk from flooding 
increases most rapidly for the first 1m of SLR.  Each additional 1m of SLR produces a smaller 
increase in the size of this area.  With 5m SLR and no further flood defences, over 900km
2
 of 
land would be inundated or at risk from flooding from the 1000 year event (Dawson et al, 
2005).  
An experimental flood damage model developed by The Flood Hazard Research Centre 
(FHRC) utilising flood damage data in updated form (Penning-Rowsell et al., 1992; Penning-
Rowsell et al. 2005) shows that the physical impact of flooding on property directly affected by 
inundation due to the 5 m sea-level rise scenario (i.e. very deep flooding in many parts of the 
floodplain) would be about £76 billion with about £40 billion being the residential property at 
2002 prices)   This would be an enormous loss given that DEFRA estimated annual average 
flood damage in England and Wales to be in the region of £1 billion in 2004 (Association of 
British Insurers 2004), and the summer 2007 floods in England and Wales are believed to 
have generated losses of around £4-£5 billion  The estimates produced by the FHRC model 
is for economic losses and does not take into account the indirect costs of such inundation, 
such as loss of working, the impact on trade, infrastructure and the insurance industry or the 
possible migration of people and businesses out of the area due to loss of confidence in 
London as a secure centre. Nor does it take account of potential secondary impacts of 
flooding beyond London.  Although national economic loss estimates provide the basis for 
decisions about government investment in flood protection in the UK, they are not the whole 
picture.  Financial losses in the commercial sector can be expected to be much larger than 
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economic losses, and will drive the decisions about the future viability and location of 
businesses.    
As the sea-level rises the increased risk of major flooding due to storm surges increases 
dramatically. The impacts of storm surges in the Thames estuary were assessed using a 
computer model of flood propagation.  This provides estimates of flood depth and extent for a 
number of sea-level rise scenarios which can be used to help quantify the economic and 
social impact of inundation.   
The high property density in the area will result in very high primary direct damages from any 
flood event.  Moreover, important commercial districts, such as Canary Wharf, are in the 
higher risk zones – being placed under threat from only a small increase in sea level.  Whilst 
the direct damages to property and infrastructure may be large, the potential impact on the 
London economy through business interruption costs could be very significant (Parker 2007).  
The worst case scenario is perhaps illustrated by the 2005 Katrina/New Orleans disaster.  
Businesses in central New Orleans were totally destroyed; and small and medium size 
enterprises were particularly badly affected and many went bankrupt.  Those whose 
customers were mainly in the disaster-hit area lost much of their workforces whose homes 
were lost causing them to move away from the city.   The impact upon the UK economy in the 
long term might also be serious  with a worst case scenario being the loss of important 
business to other financial districts in Europe such as Frankfurt.  The global nature of many 
businesses in London might mean the impact of a serious flood event is felt by businesses 
worldwide (Dawson et al, 2005). 
The population density of London means that evacuation of large areas poses a very serious 
problem for the emergency services, the assets of which are partly located in the flood plain.  
The risk of inundation of many major central London hospitals further adds to this strain.  
Water velocities can not be reliably extracted from the computer model used in this study; 
however it can be seen that large areas of land are likely to be inundated rapidly.  Water 
levels in central London could rise at up to 2m per hour.  This rate of rise poses a very serious 
threat to human life if the barriers fail (as happened in New Orleans).  The short timescale 
over which the serious flooding of central London can occur makes the Thames estuary, and 
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those living and working in it, very vulnerable to extreme flood events, exacerbated in the 5m 
sea level rise scenario.   
In addition to urban impacts, valuable coastal habitats such as salt marsh and mudflats, which 
play an important part in coastal protection, may be progressively lost or drowned, although 
some coastal habitats might reform at the new shoreline. The additional housing development 
required by any permanent, large scale relocation of populations from inundated urban areas 
would increase the pressure on land and almost certainly result in significant habitat changes 
leading to the loss of some types.   
 
 
Figure 3: Generalised flooding in the Thames Estuary with 5 metres rise in sea level 
(assuming no new defences). 
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Figure 4: Flood zones in London with 2 and 5 m sea-level rise.  Also shows the additional 
impact of a 100 year flood. 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Properties flooded by return period 
 
5. Stakeholder interviews 
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involved in making decisions in response to the risk and which would be involved in dealing 
with the impacts or representing victims of the impacts. A „snowballing‟ process was used 
once the first round of interviews had been set up each interviewee was asked to suggest 
other organisations, preferably with named individuals   
Identifying appropriate people within an organisation was time-consuming.  It was often 
difficult to persuade busy people that considering the implications of potentially catastrophic 
sea-level rise was something they should make time to do.  People from like-minded research 
organisations were the easiest to engage as they were more familiar with discussing such 
hypothetical situations.  It was very difficult to get interest from other groups, especially those 
who work with short planning frames, such as the financial sector, industry, port authorities 
and local politicians.  It was impossible to achieve a full cross-section of actors: interviews 
were conducted with 25 individuals from 21 different organisations (22 in person and 3 by 
telephone).  The interviewees came from a range of government departments and associated 
bodies, NGOs, trade associations, the insurance industry, emergency planning, 
environmental and conservation organisations, town planners, flood risk managers, flood 
action groups, London transport systems and local government, .  In large organisations such 
as Government departments or public bodies such as the Environment Agency individuals 
from different parts of the organisation were interviewed to get both strategic and operational 
perspectives.   
The scenario was initially presented as a forecast of the form: „A high level review panel has 
concluded in 2030 that the West Antarctic Ice Sheet is beginning to collapse and there is a 
30% probability of a 5m sea-level rise by 2130‟.  Maps illustrated the area that would be 
inundated with a two metre rise and a five metre rise in sea-level (assuming no defences) 
including the additional effect of a 1 in 100 year flood event.  Interviewees were asked to 
respond as if they were in their current position but in 2030.  A range of issues were raised: 
 How would they and their institutions respond? What issues would arise? What would be 
the greatest challenges? 
 Who would have power to make decisions in this scenario?  
 What options are available and which are most likely? 
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 How would the public respond? Would there be panic or calm?  How would that affect 
decision-making?   
 What would be protected? 
 How would a solution be funded?  Who should pay? 
6. The policy exercise 
Strategy games have been used in many different situations: military strategy; corporate 
planning and forecasting; public policy and disaster preparedness (Toth and Hizsnyik 2007).  
They provide a way to integrate intangible and non-quantifiable political, societal and 
economic factors into the strategic planning process.  They can be used to think through crisis 
management and assess the performance of different strategies in advance.  The basic 
requirements for a game are a scenario, roles and rules. 
For the policy exercise game, which was a day long exercise, the rules were simply to stay in 
role, to keep to time, and to be plausible.  Material from the exercise would not be attributed 
to individual speakers (the Chatham House rule).  The roles were written to fit the positions of 
the participants but adapted for 2030. For example, English Nature (now Natural England) 
became Natura UK, with the participant playing the same role as he currently holds at English 
Nature. Prior to the event each participant, including members of the research team, received 
a paragraph of information on their role which they were free to adapt, within the limits of 
plausibility, including leaving out anything they considered implausible. The participants were 
encouraged to be creative; with such an extreme scenario, traditional approaches might be 
inappropriate.  Prior to the policy exercise, a scenario of sea-level rise in the Thames Estuary 
and a review of the effects on coastal areas and a socio-economic scenario for 2030 were 
sent to participants. 
The aim of the exercise was to investigate possible responses to a not implausible, albeit very 
low probability, high consequence scenario using the collapse of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet 
as an example.  The participants, or others in their organisations, had already been 
questioned as individuals but now they had the opportunity to hear and respond to others' 
views.  Through these interactions we aimed to uncover plausible responses to the scenario 
and identify potential weaknesses in flood management approaches to dealing with such an 
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occurrence. By undertaking this exploratory exercise we also explored whether this was a 
feasible way to look at this scenario.  It was the process of finding a solution that we were 
interested in rather than the technical merits of one solution over another.  We were not 
intending to conclude by making a definitive set of recommendations on how to respond, but 
we did hope to gain insights into the process to support the information gained from 
interviews and the literature.  Not all stakeholder groups were represented. It would have 
been interesting to compare the results of several strategy games but, this was not attempted.   
After a brief welcome and introduction, the participants were asked to be in their roles (2030 
in the morning, and 2050 in the afternoon). A meeting of the First Advisory Group on Regional 
Development had been called, chaired by a representative of the Greater London Regional 
Development Agency (a participant, in role, informed in advance).  A report had recently been 
released by the British Antarctic Survey presenting worrying new information on the state of 
the Western Antarctic Ice Sheet. The latest scientific evidence of the WAIS collapse was 
presented by a member of the project team (playing the role of a climate scientist from the 
British Antarctic Survey) along with a review of the history of flood protection and sea-level 
rise issues in the Thames Region 2000 to 2030. The chair asked the committee to discuss: 
the adequacy of the forecast; the range of potential responses; criteria for evaluating 
responses and further steps that should be taken at this point.  Later in the morning, three 
groups investigated developing a communication strategy; the economics of the options, and 
a more in depth assessment of the different options.  In plenary, criteria for assessing the best 
option were decided and prioritised.  Five options were chosen as being the most favourable.  
During lunch, a control group made up of the research team and some stakeholders met and 
reduced the list of options to three: 
 Outer barrage, protecting London to its current level of protection (see Table 1a) 
 Relocation of enterprises, infrastructure and people out of London (see Table 1b).  
 Reshaping London with some areas being inundated and others being protected (see 
Table 1c).   
The options resulting from the discussions were very simple (either „protecting‟, „abandoning‟ 
or „reshaping‟ London) which suited the purpose of the exercise. Raising embankments along 
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the Thames was discussed but not pursued as a viable option for sea level rise beyond 2m. 
However, embankments can be built very high if land is available.  In reality, there are many 
permutations of these approaches that could be applied, with, for example relocation of some 
eastern areas of London and protection of the centre. Indeed it is now widely recognised that 
effective flood management involves portfolios of measures adapted to particular localities 
(Evans et al, 2004). However, the freedom to adapt options to particular localities would have 
detracted from the clarity of the role play and would almost certainly have resulted in further 
prevarication. Furthermore, for a threat of the magnitude of the one considered here, there is 
a strong case for a coherent city-scale response.   
The outcome of the 2030 committee was disagreement and procrastination, so they failed to 
choose a response option. The control group responded to this in the design of the afternoon 
proceedings.  The afternoon session was (set in 2050 when sea levels are 1-m higher than 
2030 and rising at 5 cm/yr). An update on the WAIS collapse was given by the same climate 
scientist (a little older) and a second committee, a Royal Commission, was formed to review 
action since 2030 and agree on a response option for London.  The lack of earlier response 
meant that the standard of protection was now 1:1000, and declining rapidly.  Without action it 
would diminish to only 1:100 by 2070, and continue to decline to 1:1 by 2110.  
Table 1. Arguments for and against three options from the policy exercise, (a) 
Outer barrage, (b) Relocation out of London, and (c) Reshaping London. 
Table1a The Outer barrage 
For Against 
This could be used as an interim option to buy time for 
migration out of London 
This option is expensive, especially if it is not the whole 
solution 
The construction of the outer barrage presents a one-off 
cost that could be funded through taxes.  The assets at 
risk are so great that such a barrage would be 
technically feasible.  [The cost of construction was 
estimated during discussions to be £10-25 billion, 
depending on its location and length. This is roughly 
equivalent to the annual UK surplus on business 
revenue. 
The cost of maintaining the barrage and its associated 
defences would be very high.  The standard of protection 
provided is only as good as the weakest part of the 
defence system.  
Could be built to last many years and be designed to act 
as a transport link between the north and south banks of 
the Thames Estuary. 
This is not a sustainable option long term and it would 
have to be maintained and eventually replaced (or 
abandoned). 
This could provide the same high level of protection as 
exists now. 
The construction process could take many years, 
assuming it is technically feasible as most estuaries 
have shifting sands and the barrage would need decent 
foundations and scour protection.  The choice of site 
alone would take 2 years 
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This would be the least disruptive option for the city and 
life for most people could go on as normal. 
If you used the money required for the barrage on 
development in London it would add value and improve 
the environment making London a better place to live. 
This option creates a much bigger storage area for water 
if there is a storm surge.  
The outer barrage would have to be built as a fixed 
structure that could not be opened in to allow ships to 
pass.  So, unless a ship lock system was built into the 
barrage the Port of London would either be lost or 
moved downstream of the new barrage.   
The barrage could protect against storm surges It is difficult to know how high to build the barrage and its 
associated defences and each increment of height would 
significantly increase the cost, material resources and 
time required to construct the defences.  Being seen to 
waste money would look very bad for the government if 
the flood risk did not materialise.  
This could be the most popular option for the insurance 
industry and enabling them to provide affordable 
insurance cover. 
The problem of aggregate risk remains.  Would re-
insurers accept the risk?  25% of people in the flood risk 
area do not have domestic insurance now (ABI, 2004).  If 
premiums go up only a small amount the number of 
people who can no longer afford insurance would 
increase. 
This option could preserve London as it is now and 
nothing would have to change. 
The area protected could be perceived by the rest of the 
nation to be getting favourable treatment, reinforcing the 
north-south divide. 
The outer barrage could be designed to use the tide to 
generate electricity and possibly provide up to 6% of the 
UK‟s future renewable energy supplies. 
This option would have huge operating costs and require 
the continuous pumping of water requiring significant 
power inputs, although additional upstream defences 
may help overcome the need to pump. 
 
Table 1b Relocation of London 
For Against 
This is the safest option if people, businesses and 
infrastructure can be relocated outside the flood zone 
This option is socially complex and would need the use 
of incentives to get people to move out, unless the 
urgency was very great. 
This option is sustainable as it does not require any 
complex technology or maintenance of defences. 
To prevent the area to be inundated from being a source 
of contamination you would need to completely remove 
all potentially harmful materials such as waste and 
concrete.  This could be time consuming and expensive. 
No construction materials are required for defensive 
structures 
The evacuation process could be very time consuming, 
complicated and lead to conflict. 
The insurance system could continue as before as all 
new dwellings will be built outside the flooded area 
Would the people who relocate be compensated? How 
would this work? 
If this had Government support vulnerable groups could 
benefit from newer better housing if they relocate to a 
new area. 
Vulnerable groups might be worse off if the affluent, 
mobile section of the population leave early and relocate 
to best areas leaving only poorer areas for the most 
vulnerable sectors of society, creating ghettos and 
slums.  
This option would provide the opportunity to develop 
vibrant new towns designed to use the best new 
technology for communication systems, infrastructure, 
energy efficiency and transport and waste disposal. 
Decisions about where people should be relocated to will 
be difficult to make and could lead to tension in the host 
communities due to increased pressure on existing 
resources, perceptions of favourable treatment for the 
immigrants etc. 
Managed realignment of the coastal areas would, over 
time, provide new, natural coastal habitats 
Many coastal ecosystems will be lost including vital 
breeding grounds for rare sea birds and waders 
London would not be seen to be getting favourable 
treatment, reducing north-south tension. 
The alchemy that created London would be lost for ever, 
the heritage, the city, the culture.  It would take a long 
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time to create such a world class city elsewhere. 
This option provides opportunities for the rest of the 
nation to develop. 
London is the nation‟s financial centre.  Could the nation 
survive without it? 
 
Table 1c Reshaping London  
 For  Against 
An opportunity to redesign the central part of London in a 
new and exciting way  creating new river vistas with a 
vibrant, modern atmosphere. 
Would result in the loss of areas of historical, 
architectural and cultural interest.  Would be unpopular 
with local heritage groups, fighting to protect their 
particular building/area and also local residents losing 
their personal heritage.  Decision makers who have 
power to choose to inundate one area and save another 
would be unpopular although this could be mitigated 
through stakeholder involvement. 
New transportation systems would become viable, 
making the river the main option for the transport of 
people and goods avoiding unpleasant congestion on the 
roads and the overcrowded underground system. 
The underground system would almost certainly be lost 
due to problems associated with groundwater rise and 
the increased flood risk. 
This could be a fairly sustainable solution, assuming that 
there is no further significant rise in sea level.   
This would require the maintenance of defences on the 
protected sections.   
Some coastal and estuarine habitats would be preserved 
under this option and eventually there could be a net gain 
in habitats depending on the detailed coastal 
configuration (Nicholls and Tapsell (1995). 
Some habitats would be lost due to the rapid rise. 
Vulnerable groups, including those on lower incomes,  
might benefit from being rehoused in less vulnerable 
areas in the new plan. 
Vulnerable groups might lose out by being evicted from 
their homes in flood risk areas, perhaps without 
compensation and little choice of where they can be 
rehoused.  They might also be treated with prejudice in 
these new areas.   
This option requires less material for construction than 
the outer barrage option. 
Could be time consuming and disruptive to implement 
and much of the disruption would occur in the centre of 
the city, affecting productivity, quality of life and 
deterring tourists. 
Insurance companies could continue to provide flooding 
cover with this option. 
Insurance premiums might go up 
The risk of flooding in Central London is significantly 
reduced. 
The risk of flooding in Central London still remains, 
although it is remote.  
There would be opportunities for new uses of the river 
including diving to visit submerged buildings, water sports 
centres, floating houses, shopping malls and 
entertainment venues etc. 
It could be costly and technically complex to 
decontaminate areas before submerging them.  There 
would be a choice between removing the existing 
infrastructure or simply abandoning it.  Both options are 
problematic. 
 
The thee key criteria for choosing a suitable response option were that it should be (i) socially 
acceptable, (ii) preserve London‟s economy and (iii) support national sustainability.  The 
social and strategic importance of London was rated quite highly (although this may be biased 
by the fact that the group only considered impacts in the Thames estuary). The cost of 
funding, the capital outlay and recurrent expenditure were considered less important than a 
scheme that maintained London as a socially and economically viable centre. 
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At the end of the policy exercise (but still in roles), the participants chose their preferred 
option.  The priority scores show a balance in first choices between an outer barrage and 
reshaping London but the weighted scores gave the edge to the with the reshaping option 
slightly favoured via second choices.  A further exercise rated the options according to how 
well they met the key criteria identified earlier.  Although the outer barrage was considered to 
be the option most likely to be acceptable to the public, it was also recognised to be the least 
likely to support national sustainability.  Conversely, relocating London was considered to be 
most publicly unacceptable but much more likely to support national sustainability. Reshaping 
London was seen as somewhere in between these two options for these criteria. 
The role playing was debriefed (out of role) at the end of the day, along with an evaluation of 
the exercise. 
7. Key messages 
Plausible options for the Thames Estuary 
Both a retreat and a protect response appear to be possible for London.  The choice between 
these two options depends on a wide range of factors, some of which are beyond policy 
control e.g. an early extreme flood which triggers disinvestment from London.  Much was said 
about the logistical and financial feasibility of the different options.   
The ability to cope with a scenario of extreme sea level rise depends on the speed at which it 
is manifest. Once the sea-level rise was apparent in the role playing, actors began to draft 
specific responses and the evidence of sea level rise was confirmed as a trigger to take firm 
action in the debriefing. The rate of rise is very important in London although less important 
for some sectors as it is only the maximum height of the rise (and whether that overtops 
existing defences) that is of interest for them. Other sectors, such as coastal communities, 
nature conservation organisations and organisations dependent on or responsible for buried 
infrastructure, are very sensitive to any rise in the sea level.  
 ‘The coastline is already hard to defend.  We are concerned with 50 cm over the next 50 
years.  We are struggling already’ 
A wildlife conservation officer 
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Although the project is not a detailed engineering or economic assessment, a protection 
response for London cannot be excluded.  Visions of a global scale abandonment of the 
world‟s coasts under the scenario are not substantiated (Nicholls et al, 2007).  However, any 
protection is likely to be focussed due to the large costs associated with its construction and 
the lower population density in parts of the Thames estuary.  It seems reasonable to expect 
widespread retreat and abandonment in these areas and that protection would only be found 
in the highest value areas, if it can be justified at all.  
Paralysis in decision-making 
There were many comments on the difficulty of making decisions over such long time scales.   
‘It is extraordinarily difficult to make these decisions.  We are good over 5-10 years but 
terrible over 100 years’.  
 This is also due to the short term focus of the decision makers and many other organisations.   
‘No government works more than 2-3 years ahead.  Politically it would be difficult to see 
any government taking big, unpopular, decisions.  There would always be questions 
about probability’ 
‘political agendas may be too easily prioritised to move the investment and/or incentives 
to take preventative action into medium term, i.e. NIMTO (Not In My Term of Office)’. 
‘If you predict this kind of eventuality and make plans for it and it doesn’t materialise you 
get voted out of office.  Would the Government sit on it then, until it is too late?’  
This paralysis in decision-making and the associated delay endangers the success of a 
protection response, increasing the likelihood of the worst-case scenario of an unplanned 
abandonment of large parts of London.  The benefits of making long-term decisions were 
voiced in the policy exercise and it was generally felt that there was increasing urgency to 
develop this skill. 
‘The irony is that if we could make decisions for 100 years ahead then implementation 
would be much cheaper and there would be time to explore the benefits.  We should look 
100 years ahead and modify later – that way there would be less opposition.’ 
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A contrasting view was that, given the extreme nature of the scenario, decision-making would, 
in fact, be very simple, like a war or natural disaster.  People would accept that this was not a 
typical situation and allow decisions to be taken on their behalf.   
‘Decision making would be easy – it would be a crisis situation and there would be a 
military approach to decision-making. Cold War, military thinking, Use this approach 
rather than adjust to probabilistic threat management.’ 
Many voiced the opinion that in order to make decisions you had to be certain about the data, 
particularly where there was a huge resource commitment.  As the certainty increased it was 
envisaged that the decision-making process would become much simpler. 
‘It is not possible to allocate 10 billion pounds to flood defence based on this’  
‘If in 2030 the IPCC produced a convincing report that there was a ‘smoking gun’ then 
there would be an immediate decision to either build defences or evacuate.  The decision 
would come down to spending.’ 
Public reaction to the proposed option, which all have huge impacts for people and the 
economy, would raise questions about how resources are being allocated as some people will 
seem to benefit from the decision and others will be „victims‟.   
‘Allocation of resources, this would be a key point of tension and difficult to manage. You 
can’t do it randomly.  Losing the capital – even talk of it could lead to a huge loss of 
confidence.  Distribution of the burden of paying for the changes could lead to huge 
resentments.  Winners and losers again.’  
It was felt that certain organisations and businesses would have to give the impression that 
everything was fine, to cover up the scale of the problem.  . 
‘We need to be seen to manage, it doesn’t take much for people to be put off travelling to 
certain areas – the tourism industry would be very vulnerable to scares, like foot and 
mouth etc. – denial might be the best option for them’. 
Without a strong push from the public it might be easy to delay coming to a final decision.  
There was concern that such a push would not materialise as most people are preoccupied 
Lonsdale et al, Plausible responses to the threat of rapid sea-level rise in the Thames estuary 
 
Page 22 of 34 
with the smaller, day to day troubles that they understand and can influence. Consideration of 
these bigger, less tangible issues is put off, even when their impact on peoples lives could be 
devastating. 
‘The scale of the problem is too much for people to deal with.  There is a problem with 
denial and scaremongering - people have heard too much.  People can handle small, 
gradual changes but not the big changes.’ 
Need for new approaches to decision-making 
Faced with „reality‟, which is difficult to capture in role playing, a strategy might have to be 
imposed if there was no consensus amongst all stakeholders. However, this would take time 
to develop and might require a different decision-making environment (e.g., more 
authoritarian control due to the emergence of a „wartime‟ mentality).  
There is no easy option – tough decisions will have to be made.  In the role playing, there was 
no agreement on the best option. All the options put forward had very large financial 
implications, questions of technical feasibility and would be disruptive to implement.  Under 
each option there were groups who would be winners and groups who would be losers.   The 
default option is for there to be no planned response and let individuals do what they can to 
cope on their own.  This option would suit stakeholders who can relocate, but it would have 
large political costs, possibly significant liability exposures, and certainly not be optimal on 
social and economic criteria. 
As with the decision to build the original Thames barrier and associated defences, the 
enormous consequences of a flood in London means that decisions cannot be made using 
simplistic cost-benefit calculations as the uncertainty associated with the sea level rise and 
storm surge scenarios is too great.  A number of comments were made about the similarly 
prolonged process of building the present Thames barrier, which had eventually to be 
decided by the astronomer Sir Herman Bondi (Gilbert and Horner, 1984). 
The involvement of the public 
In the role playing, the main public responses to the forecast were thought to be either denial 
or panic.  To avoid both, clear communication of the present state of knowledge and 
strategies under consideration was strongly supported.  Adoption of any public strategy would 
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require a clear, transparent process that enables people to contribute and understand 
decisions made about their future.  A few felt that involving the public in decision-making 
would cause delay and conflict and it was better to make a decision and present it as a fait 
accompli. This would depend on the ability to implement the decision without public support if 
necessary (as might be the case for an estuary barrage). 
The way in which information was communicated to the public was thought to be important 
and this was brought up frequently in the interviews and the policy exercise.  How it was 
actually presented (on television, an article in a newspaper etc.), who should present it (an 
academic, the prime minister, the King) and in how much detail would influence how the 
public responded and how much they could contribute to decision-making.  
there is a great risk of inaccurate reporting by the media which could lead to widespread 
panic and property blight’ 
Although open consultation might lead to ‘lots of reports and paralysis‟, the overwhelming 
feeling in both the interviews and the policy exercise was that public engagement was very 
important and should be started early, ‘we have got to start talking to communities’. 
Flood events as catalysts for action 
Flood events are important catalysts for action (Johnson et al, 2004).  In the role playing, the 
scenario included a flood event, between 2030 and 2050, that made the risk tangible and 
which provided a sense of urgency that motivated new and more radical strategies, previously 
not given much weight.  However, if people were not aware of a trend in sea-level rise the 
events might not trigger new action if there was no strategy „on the table‟ and ready to be 
implemented quickly.  People have surprisingly short memories and if the opportunity is not 
grasped promptly the policy window for new ideas might close. 
Financial markets don’t act rationally. If the only signal to the market is a report it could be 
easily ignored or lost.  If, however it was preceded by 30 years of poor weather or if there 
was a devastating storm surge – that would act as confirmation’ 
Flood events or near flood events were mentioned a number of times for their effectiveness in 
focussing public attention on the scenario as well as that of the policy makers.  It was 
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suggested that it would be wise to have measures ready for such events for the 
communication of flood risk to the public. 
‘The floods in 2030 would have been a powerful catalyst, but you have to channel it – the 
momentum soon dissipates’ 
‘Floods have helped to inject a sense of urgency into the proceedings – without them 
there is no incentive for action – denial [is] much easier.  Floods have reminded people 
that the threat is real and significant.‟ 
„You need a disaster to force them [the government] to take action.’ 
8. Plausible narratives 
Two narratives appear to be consistent with the interviews and discussions during the policy 
exercise.  They illustrate two alternative ways in which society might cope with the scenario of 
catastrophic sea-level rise. Both are hypothetical, suggesting futures that are somewhat 
different from present flood risk management. 
Abandonment: Presented with a forecast of extreme sea level rise of 5m in 100 
years beginning in 2030 with a 30% level of confidence based on a consensus of 
experts, stakeholders in the Thames region would not immediately adopt proactive 
action.  This is partly because of the sense of protection in London established by an 
overhaul of the Thames flood protection scheme in the period from 2005 to 2030 for 
1m of sea level rise.  However, the major impediments to action are not the 
uncertainty in the forecast but the scale of the threat and the need for concerted 
action by different stakeholders, each with conflicting views as to the best course of 
action.  The option to protect London by raising existing defences or an outer barrier 
would be very expensive (a recent estimate for the cost of an outer barrier was £20 
billion, without the additional defence work, have high recurring costs and present 
practical difficulties.  It is attractive only if national or European finance would be 
available.  A reshaping of London taking advantage of the larger estuary is an 
attractive vision but would also require substantial funding to decontaminate landfills 
and remove installations that would be inundated. Delays in responding—it might 
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take a decade or more to design and evaluate viable alternatives—would limit the 
responses as the flood risk on top of the accelerated sea level rise starts to affect 
property insurance and reconstruction after relatively minor floods.  The relocation 
option, essentially abandoning parts of London, is undesirable, but is likely to end up 
as the de facto response as enterprises and households assess the risks on an 
individual basis.   
The unplanned response of this narrative assumes individual action to locate new investment 
outside of the potential risk zone, and even dis-invest from London, will dominate the attempts 
to define a socially desirable, public response.  Even the rapid and extreme scenario posed to 
the stakeholders did not trigger an agreed response that protects London (physically, 
economically and as cultural heritage).   
Civic response. While the initial response to the forecast was confusion, further 
studies of the risks and disputes over the scale of action required, the government 
and civic society came together to establish a viable decision making framework in 
which to anticipate a large-scale, planned response.  Many options for financing the 
response were investigated including the extent to which London could finance its 
own salvation.  In addition to a local tax, national and EU-wide financial support was 
obtained and a fund created for design studies, pilot tests and eventually direct 
subsidies for affected areas.  The legal responsibility to protect private property from 
environmental threats related to climate change was shared between government 
and private land owners.  This included a mechanism to internalise the future costs of 
protection, preventing companies and, to some extent, land owners from simply 
abandoning property that might be inundated in the future. 
Although neither narrative necessarily results in successful adaptation, they illustrate how 
various factors are important in determining the likely response to such an extreme scenario.  
The extent of government control over spatial planning and risk management determines the 
degree to which the disparate private actions can be brought together into a public, planned 
response.  In the absence of a strong national framework, decentralised decision making 
would be likely to result in an unplanned, chaotic response.  A related factor is the ability to 
take decisions with very long time scales, helping to facilitate a concerted response.  If 
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decisions are focussed on local, short term issues this would support an inefficient, chaotic, 
short-sighted response. 
The viability of spreading the financial burden will determine the scale of response that can be 
anticipated.  In the absence of viable financial support from national or European (or even 
global) sources, the disproportionate burden on London residents might encourage 
abandonment and work against a concerted, public response although given London‟s large 
economy maybe the resources could be generated internally.  Public engagement and 
cultures of conflict or cooperation in public decision making will shape debates between 
private actions and socially desirable responses.  While these are both essential to a planned 
response, a chaotic response might proceed even with a high degree of public awareness 
and involvement in strategic decision-making due to other constraints (primarily legal and 
financial). 
Observed trends and flood events, the risk realised, will stimulate responses, but could push 
actors either into or away from socially planned strategies.  If a flood event occurs early in the 
planning cycle, this might help foster cooperation and support for ambitious responses.  
However, if the threat is realised in the absence of a concerted and viable action plan (at least 
as perceived by the actors) then the dominant response could be chaotic, private actions to 
minimise individual risks. 
9. Conclusion: Toward adaptive management 
The potential paralysis in decision-making highlighted in the policy exercise could prove to be 
determining factor in whether society can cope with the extreme scenario considered here 
and has wider implications than just WAIS collapse.  The prime causes of this paralysis (the 
lack of experience of planning over longer time frames, the large scale of the response 
required, the need for coordinated action between many different actors with conflicting 
agendas, and the uncertainty of the available information) act to prevent an effective 
assessment of the situation and thus the possibility of an effective response.  Increasing 
capacity for adaptive management that could better respond to the full range of threats, 
including large-scale threats as considered here, requires action in several directions. 
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Supporting longer term decision-making 
The human tendency to focus on here and now, „fight or flight‟ responses, make it less easy 
to take longer term futures into account (Ornstein & Ehrlich, 1989).  Decision and policy 
makers need tools to support long term predictions, to identify creative new approaches, to 
investigate the robustness of different adaptation and mitigation options to a range of future 
scenarios of climate and socio-economic futures.  A move from solution driven approaches to 
processes of continual management rests on understanding the complex interactions 
between socio-economic, natural and technical solutions, and include people‟s values and 
beliefs as well as scientific measurements.  A portfolio of responses, including engineering 
options (e.g. dikes, barriers), social (e.g. early warning systems, emergency preparedness) 
and land use planning solutions (e.g. building codes, flood proofing), are more likely to be 
effective and adopted than the simple strategies evaluated in the stakeholder policy exercise.   
Social learning and inclusion of the public in the process 
The policy exercise and interviews emphasized the importance of public engagement in the 
decision-making process required for this scenario although there was some difference of 
opinion as to how great this should be, especially for an extreme scenario that requires an 
urgent response. People in the UK are not used to feeling exposed to severe threats to their 
existence. Respondents noted a „somebody ought to do something‟ mentality. Raising 
awareness would need to jolt people out of their complacency and make it clear that although 
the threat is uncertain there is a real risk and that they have a role in reducing their exposure. 
A flood might do this; or the insurance industry threatening to reduce or withdraw cover might 
be effective in forcing people to take the threat seriously.   
People would need formal and informal education and access to unbiased information.  As 
there is likely to be conflicting opinions on any decision, the media would have a role in 
presenting information and alternative opinions.  Teaching people the skills of conflict 
management would enhance cooperative and inclusive approaches.  
Making decisions with uncertainty 
Learning how to make decisions under uncertainty is essential for adaptive management 
(McMichael, 1993, Dovers and Handmer, 1992, 1995, Handmer 1996, Ravetz, 1990).  In the 
context of climate change, it is important to distinguish between different degrees of 
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uncertainty. Whilst there is a range of uncertainty, current sea level rise projections provide a 
reliable basis for some decisions. On the other hand, the sea level rise scenario addressed in 
this paper is surprising; an announcement that it is going to materialize would inevitably be 
met with some scientific skepticism, which would contribute to the inertia observed in the role 
play exercise. Under circumstances of severe uncertainty, new approaches to decision-
making that recognise incomplete knowledge and lack of experience (Dovers and Handmer, 
1996, Smithson 1989), and thus do not require accurate assessment of probabilities are 
required. This points to methods based upon use of a wide range of scenarios (without 
necessarily attaching probabilities to those scenarios) and analysis of robustness to 
uncertainty (Dessai and Hulme, 2007, Hall, 2007, Lempert et al., 2003).  
New social and institutional approaches 
„Change at the margins‟ or fine tuning existing structures and institutions may be sufficient up 
to a point (Dovers and Handmer, 1992), but coping effectively with the extreme scenario 
described here will require fundamental changes to institutional processes.  New institutions 
will be needed that can react flexibly, particularly ones that have the ability to reflect on and 
learn from their experiences and then act on their learning to suit changing circumstances.  
Flood management in such a scenario needs to move from managing nature to working with 
nature and managing ourselves (McMasters, 1993).  Addressing our role in the problem 
means examining our behaviour and addressing those activities that increase risks or prevent 
transformations to more sustainable lifestyles. 
What can we learn from not implausible scenarios? 
Insights into responses to forecasts of low probability, high consequence threats will be 
gleaned from a variety of approaches and processes.  Extreme, not implausible scenarios 
and stakeholder role playing, open debates regarding the shift from incremental climate 
adaptation (in the case presented here, flood management) to institutional and policy 
changes at a much broader scale, (Johnson et al. (2004).   
Climate change is not a remote issue for future generations.  In 2001 the Intergovernmental-
Panel on Climate Change report characterized the West Antarctic Ice Sheet as a „slumbering 
giant‟ but dismissed concerns that it was disintegrating (Watson et al, 2001).  At a recent 
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IPCC conference (February 2005), Chris Rapley, Director of the British Antarctic Survey 
(BAS) said „‟the giant has awakened. The previous view was that WAIS would not collapse 
before 2100.  We now have to revise that judgment.  We cannot be so sanguine‟‟ (Rapley 
2005). 
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